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Justice Scalia’s Originalism and Formalism:
The Rule of Criminal Law as a Law of Rules
Stephanos Bibas

F

ar too many reporters and pundits collapse law
into politics, assuming that the left–right divide
between Democratic and Republican appointees
neatly explains politically liberal versus politically
conservative outcomes at the Supreme Court. The
late Justice Antonin Scalia defied such caricatures.
Justice Scalia was a jurist through and through,
not a politician, and for the most part practiced
what he preached. His consistent judicial philosophy made him the leading exponent of originalism,
textualism, and formalism in American law, and
over the course of his three decades on the Court,
he changed the terms of judicial debate. Now, as a
result, supporters and critics alike start with the
plain meaning of the statutory or constitutional
text rather than loose appeals to legislative history
or policy.
Justice Scalia’s approach was perhaps most striking and counterintuitive in criminal law and procedure. He was known to confess that as a policy
matter, he favored vigorous law enforcement and
punishment, but as a jurist, he championed a principled understanding of the rule of law. His approach
helped to preserve individual liberty, make the law
clearer and more consistent and transparent, give
citizens better notice, promote democratic accountability, and check prosecutors’ and judges’ power.
Sometimes, his principles led to politically conservative results, as with Eighth Amendment limits
on punishments; in other areas, such as the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation and Jury Trial Clauses,
he was criminal defendants’ best friend. Whatever
the outcome, Justice Scalia strove to follow his principles, and in doing so, he promoted important values of the rule of law.

A Consistent Methodology

The first thing to note about Justice Scalia’s
methodology is that he had one. Many jurists drift
along, cobbling together a congeries of decisions
without articulating how one decides. Justice Scalia,
by contrast, was famed as the leading proponent of
originalism and formalism.
Justice Scalia championed the Constitution’s original understanding. Before him, many

originalists seemed to focus on the Framers’ subjective intent, a hazardous inquiry given the paucity
of sources and the difficulty of separating sincerity
from propaganda.
Rather than plumbing the Framers’ minds, Justice Scalia took an objective approach. He asked
what the words of the text meant at the time they
were enacted. Thus, his originalism was a species of
textualism.1 In the Scalia era, litigators learned to
put less emphasis on legislative history and more on
the words of the Constitution or statute itself, supplemented by dictionary definitions and the like.

Rather than plumbing the Framers’
minds, Justice Scalia asked what the
words of the text meant at the time
they were enacted. In the Scalia era,
litigators learned to put less emphasis
on legislative history and more on
the words of the Constitution or
statute itself.
Objective-meaning originalism, he emphasized,
respects the democratic decisions of those who
voted to enact the text. Moreover, it preserves the
separation of powers, a value often overlooked in the
criminal law.2
Originalism safeguards the Framers’ and legislature’s prerogative to make and amend laws. It also
protects the right to a jury, the “spinal column of
American democracy”—the only right that appears
in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.3 The Bill of Rights is replete with jury protections, including the Fifth Amendment’s Grand
Jury Clause, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of
criminal petit juries, and the Seventh Amendment’s
guarantee of civil petit juries.
The Framers valued juries as essential checks on
all three branches of government. Legislatures pass
overly broad criminal statutes, which may sweep in
morally faultless conduct and sympathetic defendants, but juries apply them to the facts. Overzealous prosecutors must persuade both a grand and a
petit jury to charge and convict felony defendants,
5
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and judges can neither override juries’ decisions to
acquit nor authorize retrial after an acquittal. The
lay, popular voice of jurors is supposed to be a counterweight to our increasingly professionalized criminal justice system.
Most often, Justice Scalia’s originalism went
hand in hand with his formalism. As he famously
put it, “Long live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men.”4
Thus, his famous essay praised “the rule of law as a
law of rules.”5 Rules help to constrain judicial discretion, preserve space for democratic branches, and
increase predictability. Those benefits, in his view,
more than outweigh the costs of over- and underinclusive rules as well as rigidity. Of course laws need
to be updated from time to time, but that is a job for
legislatures, not courts.
Newspaper reporters who saw the Supreme Court
of the United States as a political horse race often
contrasted Justice Scalia with his supposed political
opposite, Justice John Paul Stevens. But in criminal
law and procedure, those two justices agreed surprisingly often. Justice Scalia’s true foil was, rather,
Justice Stephen Breyer.
Justice Breyer looked to the future; Justice Scalia, to the past. Justice Breyer inquired about wise
policy and legislative history; Justice Scalia stuck
to the text. Justice Breyer trusted technocratic
experts; Justice Scalia, democracy. Justice Breyer
prized efficiency, but Justice Scalia subordinated efficiency to liberty.6 And while Justice Breyer emphasized judicial flexibility, Justice Scalia
sought to protect juries. As Justice Scalia put it, the
jury trial “has never been efficient; but it has always
been free.”7 The two justices’ approaches could not
have been more different.

Criminal Procedure and the Constitution

The Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia’s contributions are clearest in his approach to two provisions of the Sixth Amendment. For one, he rescued
the Confrontation Clause from near-oblivion.
For decades, courts had conflated and confounded the constitutional right to confront one’s accusers with the nonconstitutional hearsay doctrines
in the law of evidence that grew up well after the
Founding. In 1980, the Supreme Court had interpreted the clause as establishing only a presumption in favor of live testimony. Out-of-court evidence
was nevertheless admissible if it fell within a “firmly
6

rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.”8 Those mushy standards suggested multifactor balancing tests that led
to inconsistent and unpredictable results.
That approach had drifted far from the text
and historical understanding of the Sixth Amendment. The text calls for a rule, not a standard: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right…to be confronted with the witnesses against
him….”9 That language says nothing about a mere
presumption, nor about hearsay. Nor does it entrust
judges with gauging substantive reliability. Rather,
it requires them to ensure a particular procedure—
“confront[ation] with the witnesses against him”—
so that juries can weigh reliability for themselves.
The historical understanding of the confrontation guarantee underscored the textual guarantee.
The English common-law tradition had long relied
on adversarial testing and cross-examining live
witnesses in open court, unlike the introduction of
pretrial questioning by inquisitorial systems. In the
notorious English treason trial of Sir Walter Raleigh,
however, the prosecution had introduced a letter
and an unsworn out-of-court statement by Raleigh’s
alleged accomplice and refused to bring the accusers
into court for cross-examination. In reaction to this
and similar abuses, English and then American law
excluded ex parte written evidence and required live
cross-examination to ensure truth. Thus, the Confrontation Clause’s core purpose was to prevent the
use of ex parte written examinations as a substitute
for live testimony in open court.10
For years, several justices including Justice Scalia had written separately, seeking to reinvigorate
the Confrontation Clause.11 In 2004, in Crawford
v. Washington, he succeeded. Writing for a sevenJustice majority, Justice Scalia replaced the hearsay
balancing test with a bright-line rule: A witness is
one who gives testimony, not just anything that falls
within the jumbled hearsay rule, and testimony is
a formal statement to government officers made in
order to prove a fact.12 Confrontation requires an
opportunity to question a witness and challenge his
account face-to-face.
No test is self-defining, and further cases had
to spell out the contours of these terms. As Justice
Scalia later wrote for a nearly unanimous Court, a
domestic-abuse victim’s statement to a police officer after a domestic-abuse incident has ended qualifies as testimony, but a 911 call right after such an
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incident does not; the former was made primarily to
facilitate investigating crime, while the latter was
primarily a cry for help.13
Some of these line-drawing questions have been
controversial. Even if a declarant is unavailable for
cross-examination because the defendant allegedly
killed her, according to Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court, the defendant has not forfeited his confrontation right by his own wrongdoing unless he killed her
in order to prevent her from testifying.14 And in some,
the Court has narrowed the confrontation right over
Justice Scalia’s dissent. Most notably, the Court, over
Justice Scalia’s dissent, has been willing to find that
a dying gunshot victim’s statements to police were
made not primarily to ensure the shooter’s arrest and
conviction, but to address the ongoing threat to public
safety posed by a shooter on the loose.15
Perhaps the most questionable aspect of the Crawford doctrine is its expansion to forensic and scientific tests. Laboratory analysis is a far cry from the
unsworn letter and out-of-court interrogation that
Sir Walter Raleigh sought to confront. It is not always
clear who is the relevant witness, nor what laboratory
protocols, experts, and equipment a defendant needs
access to in order to challenge a machine readout.16
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
extended Crawford to require live testimony, not just
sworn lab reports, by the lab analyst who tests drugs.
The defendant’s ability to subpoena the witness if
desired, the Court held, is no substitute.17

Justice Scalia has left an enduring
legacy and changed the terms of
debate. He has renewed focus on the
Constitution’s text, structure, and
history, which prize an adversarial,
oral approach to criminal justice in
open court.
At its best, the Crawford line of cases united a
coalition of liberal as well as conservative justices,
both formalists and those concerned more pragmatically with the unfairness of introducing unchallenged testimony. But the further the facts are from
a classic out-of-court deposition, sworn statement,
or police interrogation, the weaker the consensus is.
The lab analyst cases, in particular, have fractured

the Court. Four justices, led by Justice Scalia, supported or leaned toward applying Crawford broadly
to forensic evidence. Four justices disagreed. Oddly
enough, the swing justice in these cases has been
Justice Clarence Thomas, who alone among his
colleagues treats formal, sworn laboratory certificates as testimony in violation of Crawford, but not
unsworn lab reports.18
On other Confrontation Clause issues, Justice
Scalia likewise sometimes succeeded (and sometimes did not) in bringing along a majority of the
Court. He wrote for a majority that shielding child
witnesses from seeing a defendant violated the
defendant’s right to confront his accusers.19 Soon
thereafter, however, a majority of the Court, over
Justice Scalia’s dissent, upheld a child-abuse victim’s testifying via one-way closed-circuit television
instead of in the defendant’s physical presence.20
The majority stressed the vital need to protect childabuse victims from further trauma; Justice Scalia’s
dissent emphasized the text’s bright-line rule.
Justice Scalia did not always succeed in persuading the Court to apply these new rules as he would
have liked. He has reproached the Court not only for
promulgating vague, unpredictable legal standards
(like the pre-Crawford standard), but also for applying ostensibly clear rules (like Crawford or face-toface testimony) in strained, fact-specific, or unpredictable ways. Over his dissents, some of the Court’s
decisions have swung back toward looking at more
factors, such as the presence of a gun, the evidence
of an ongoing emergency, other indicia of reliability,
and harms to children. Justice Thomas’s insistence
that testimony be formal has limited the breadth of
Crawford’s reach. In addition, Justice Scalia arguably overreached in extending the Confrontation
Clause woodenly to forensic analysts, where there
is little text or history to illuminate what confrontation is required.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia has left an enduring legacy and changed the terms of debate. He has
renewed focus on the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, which prize an adversarial, oral
approach to criminal justice in open court, although
there remain plenty of questions about how analogous 18th century abuses are to 21st century technologies.
The Jury Trial Clause. Justice Scalia also
spearheaded the revival of another clause of the
Sixth Amendment: the Jury Trial Clause.
7
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Throughout most of the 19th and 20th centuries, judges dominated criminal sentencing, finding
facts and imposing sentences within broad ranges
with little if any role for juries. The Court repeatedly blessed this judicial free hand, largely unfettered by procedural rules, even when a judicial finding triggered a mandatory minimum sentence.21 The
Court refused to lay down any rule specifying what
facts must be elements of crimes to be proved to a
jury, offering only the most impressionistic, offhand
remark in McMillan v. Pennsylvania: “The statute
gives no impression of having been tailored to permit the [sentence-enhancement] finding to be a tail
which wags the dog of the substantive offense.”22

The Court’s casual, pragmatic
dismissal of a Sixth Amendment
challenge in McMillan v. Pennsylvania
conflicted both with Justice Scalia’s
concern for the text and with his
insistence upon meaningful, firm rules.
The Court’s casual, pragmatic dismissal of a Sixth
Amendment challenge conflicted both with Justice
Scalia’s concern for the text and with his insistence
upon meaningful, firm rules. In a seemingly minor
immigration-crime case, Justice Scalia revived the
issue in a dissent, strongly suggesting (and later arguing) that any fact that increases a maximum sentence
must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.23
Within a few years, he succeeded in persuading Justice Thomas, converting his dissenting suggestion
into law.
nn

nn

nn
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Apprendi v. New Jersey held that prosecutors must
prove any fact (other than a prior conviction) that
increases a statutory maximum sentence to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.24
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Blakely v.
Washington applied the same rule to sentencing
guidelines, invalidating binding guidelines triggered by judicial fact-finding.25
Soon after, the Court extended Blakely’s logic
to invalidate the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’
binding force, rendering them advisory because

judges cannot find facts that trigger mandatory
enhancements.26
nn

The Court also applied Apprendi’s logic to require
juries, not judges, to find facts needed to make
defendants eligible for the death penalty.27

In this line of cases, formalism triumphed over
loosey-goosey functionalism. Justice Scalia’s Blakely majority opinion forcefully criticized the “obvious” “subjectivity” of McMillan’s tail-wags-the-dog
standard. The standard was so murky that people
could always disagree about whether an enhancement went “too far” and never prove otherwise.28
With mordant humor, the justice mocked the canine
standard that would:
require that the ratio of sentencing-factor addon to basic criminal sentence be no greater than
the ratio of caudal vertebrae to body in the breed
of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no
greater than the average such ratio for all breeds.
Or perhaps the median. Regrettably, Apprendi
has prevented full development of this line of
jurisprudence.29

Justice Scalia’s barbs made reading footnotes fun.
Interestingly, the Court later extended Apprendi’s
logic even further than Justice Scalia was willing to
go. Justice Scalia repeatedly voted to allow judges to
find facts that trigger mandatory minimum sentences within an authorized sentencing range, because
minimums do not exceed the range authorized by
the jury.30 The Court eventually went further, holding that juries must find any fact that raises a minimum or maximum sentence.31
As with Crawford, in the Apprendi/Blakely line
of cases, Justice Scalia assembled a coalition of
more liberal Justices Stevens, David Souter, and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg together with fellow originalist conservative Justice Thomas. The divide on the
Court was not between left and right as conventionally understood, but between the formalists (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas, and later Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
Kagan) and the pragmatists (Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and Breyer, and later Justice Samuel Alito
and sometimes Chief Justice John Roberts).
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And as with Crawford, that coalition did not always
hold fast. Though five justices in Booker found that the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg switched sides on the remedial question. Thus, instead of insisting that juries find
guidelines-enhancement facts, the Booker remedial
opinion invalidated the guidelines’ binding force and
left judges in charge of applying the now-advisory
guidelines. The irony is that the Sixth Amendment
jury-trial guarantee produced not a clear rule operated by juries, but a fuzzier standard that entrusts more
power and discretion to judges.
The Apprendi/Blakely line of cases landed an
important symbolic blow for juries, underscoring
their constitutional role, but well over a decade later,
the impact of this doctrine remains unclear. Juries
are still an endangered species, as plea bargaining
remains rampant and resolves 19 out of 20 cases. Sentencing guidelines still leave judges with lots of power
that is hidden from view and unchecked by juries.
Justice Scalia would have dynamited the entire edifice of the U.S. Sentencing Commission as violating
the separation of powers, but his lonely dissent to that
effect drew no other takers.32 As with Crawford, problems persist in applying an 18th century right to novel
and unanticipated 21st century realities.

The Fourth Amendment

Justice Scalia also surprised many observers
in his somewhat civil-libertarian approach to the
Fourth Amendment. On certain issues, he advocated
clear rules that favored law enforcement, such as the
objective (rather than subjective) test for the reasonableness of a stop.33 When it came to defining searches and reasonableness, however, his originalism and
formalism led him to support rules that very often
favored criminal suspects.
Take the issue of what qualifies as a search in the
first place. When an object is in plain view of police
who are already lawfully present there, they may
seize it without a warrant. Many justices were willing to extend the plain-view doctrine to allow a trivial
additional intrusion by police, but not Justice Scalia.
Writing for the Court in Arizona v. Hicks, he held that
police may not move a stereo turntable even a few
inches to view and record its serial number without
first getting a warrant supported by probable cause.34
Unlike many other conservative members of the
Court, Justice Scalia was also willing to recognize a
variety of intrusions, new and old, as searches.

nn

nn

nn

His opinion for the Court in Kyllo v. United States
held that pointing a thermal-imaging device at a
house to detect heat emanating from it counts as
a search;35
Likewise, in Florida v. Jardines, he wrote for the
Court in holding that a trained drug-sniffing
dog’s sniffing of a suspect’s front porch and front
door constituted a search and required a warrant;36 and
His opinion for a majority of the Court in United
States v. Jones held that attaching a GPS tracking
device to a suspect’s car and tracking his movements qualified as a search.37

In all three of these cases, he rejected the amorphous, unpredictable reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test in favor of bright-line rules rooted in
the common law of trespass upon an owner’s property rights.
Justice Scalia was also far more willing than
many other justices to clearly demarcate searches
that were categorically unreasonable. While he was
willing to allow drug testing based on individualized
suspicion, he dissented from allowing suspicionless
searches,38 and in dissent in Maryland v. King, he
argued that routine, suspicionless cheek swabs of
arrestees to collect their DNA were unreasonable
searches: “The Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no
basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or
is in possession of incriminating evidence. That prohibition is categorical and without exception; it lies
at the very heart of the Fourth Amendment.”39 As he
memorably put it, “I doubt that the proud men who
wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so
eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”40

Justice Scalia enforced the Fourth
Amendment vigorously, starting from
common-law baselines.
In that vein, the justice was the key fifth vote in Arizona v. Gant to limit searches of cars incident to arrest.
Such searches can include looking for weapons or all
destructible evidence only if the area is still within
the suspect’s reach. Once the suspect is handcuffed
9
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and away from the car, police may search the car only
for evidence of the crime of arrest. So when a suspect
has been arrested for driving with a suspended license
and handcuffed in the back of a patrol car, police may
not then rummage around the car in search of drugs
or the like. The Court drew this test from one of Justice Scalia’s earlier concurrences.41
Justice Scalia enforced the Fourth Amendment
vigorously, starting from common-law baselines.
That led him to reject subjective privacy tests in favor
of those that are grounded in trespass and property
law. As to vehicle searches, he acknowledged that
“the historical practices the Framers sought to preserve” were unclear, so he relied upon “traditional
standards of reasonableness.”42
The justice was quite right that common law and
history can often provide clearer baselines than circular reasoning about expectations of privacy, but
as Justice Alito has observed, these historical sources cannot provide definitive verdicts on 21st century technological searches, such as DNA analysis or
assembling a mosaic of data points from long-term
GPS tracking.43 Justice Scalia did not have all the
answers, but at least he began with the right questions.

The Eighth Amendment

Justice Scalia consistently opposed extending
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to forbid capital punishment. The
Constitution expressly references the long-settled
practice of capital punishment, and judges may not
use evolving standards of decency to trump the textual and historical warrant for the death penalty.
“[P]assionate and deeply held” views opposing capital punishment, he wrote, are “no excuse for reading them into a Constitution that does not contain
them,” particularly since doing so would “thrust a
minority’s views upon the people.”44 In that vein,
he dissented from the Court’s holdings that a state
may not execute a defendant for the crime of raping a child and that it may not execute defendants
who are mentally retarded or were under 18 years
of age.45
Justice Scalia also opposed much of the Court’s
intricate regulation of capital sentencing procedures. In particular, he rejected the Woodson/Lockett/Eddings doctrine requiring unfettered admission of all mitigating evidence in capital sentencing
as being starkly at odds with the requirement of rules
to channel and guide the capital sentencing process.
10

“To acknowledge that ‘there perhaps is an inherent
tension’ between [the two] line[s] of cases,” he wrote
in Walton v. Arizona, “is rather like saying that there
was perhaps an inherent tension between the Allies
and the Axis Powers in World War II.”46 That position was not only formalist in embracing rules over
unfettered discretion, but also originalist in supporting a textually and historically approved punishment that used to be prescribed for many cases.

Justice Scalia’s position in Walton
v. Arizona was not only formalist in
embracing rules over unfettered
discretion, but also originalist in
supporting a textually and historically
approved punishment that used to be
prescribed for many cases.
The justice likewise opposed invalidating various
noncapital sentences as cruel and unusual, though
he could not persuade a majority of his colleagues
to agree. He advanced a series of textual and historical arguments to show that the clause forbids only
certain modes of punishment and legally unauthorized punishments, not disproportionality between
a particular crime and its particular punishment.47
(While that position is a reasonable one, recent originalist scholarship has argued powerfully for reading
the clause to require retributive proportionality.48)
He also joined in dissenting from recent decisions
that restricted sentences of life imprisonment without parole for juvenile defendants.49

Substantive Criminal Law

Justice Scalia’s insistence on clear rules informed
his reading of substantive criminal statutes, often
in ways that benefitted defendants. The justice was
famous for vigorously advancing the rule of lenity as a
corollary of his textualism. If a legislature unambiguously criminalizes conduct, it gives potential violators
clear notice and fair warning;50 if it does not, prosecutors and judges may not take it upon themselves to
stretch wording to cover borderline criminal conduct.
There certainly is room to question Justice Scalia’s emphasis on notice, which, as he admitted, is necessarily a fiction in practice: Few if any prospective
thieves or tax evaders spend their spare time reading
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statute books. But lenity gives legislatures a clear
background rule against which they can legislate and
requires the democratic process to authorize criminal punishment and stigma.51 If legislatures dislike
restrained readings of criminal statutes, they remain
free to amend them to make them broader and clearer.

on the side of criminal defendants, even though his
personal sympathies were pro-prosecution.
Often, he could not persuade a majority of his colleagues to follow his originalist principles to his logical conclusion.
nn

The frequency with which Justice
Scalia applied the rule of lenity
underscored his willingness to follow
his principled methodology even
where it produced results he might not
personally like.
The justice voted to apply lenity to a wide range of
crimes, from money laundering to carjacking to tax
evasion,52 and in doing so, he focused solely on whether the text was clear, without recourse to legislative
history.53 He did sometimes find statutory text clear
enough to preclude recourse to lenity, even where
other justices disagreed,54 but the frequency with
which he applied the rule of lenity underscored his
willingness to follow his principled methodology even
where it produced results he might not personally like.
Justice Scalia’s emphasis on clear rules, notice,
and fair warning also led him to strike down laws
that were simply too vague to salvage. He advocated
invalidating the residual clause of the Armed Career
Criminal Act as violating the due process requirement of fair notice. After advancing this position
in repeated dissents for years, he ultimately won
a majority of the Court over to his side last year,
writing for the Court in striking down the residual
clause.55 He also would have gone further than the
Court did to rein in honest-services fraud. While the
majority of the Court limited that statute to bribery
and kickbacks, Justice Scalia would have invalidated the entire provision as too vague to salvage and
beyond the power of judges to rewrite.56

Conclusion

In short, Justice Scalia defied simplistic ideological labels. In doing so, he underscored one of his
favorite themes: that law is (or at least should be)
much more than politics. His methodologically conservative embrace of formalism, clarity, rules, and
especially textualism and originalism often put him

nn

nn

He was no fan of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, but the most he could do was to dissuade his colleagues from expanding it by balancing the rule’s speculative deterrent benefits
against its concrete costs.57
In a trio of cases, Justice Scalia dissented from
extending the right to effective assistance of
counsel to plea bargaining, as doing so “embraces the sporting-chance theory of criminal law, in
which the State functions like a conscientious
casino operator, giving each player a fair chance
to beat the house, that is, to serve less time than
the law says he deserves.”58
In dissent, he criticized Miranda as “a milestone
of judicial overreaching” and the Court’s reaffirmation of it as “the very Cheops’ Pyramid (or
perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue)
of judicial arrogance.”59

He had a rhetorical gift for sharpening the nub
of almost any issue, piercing the prosy fog of the U.S.
Reports.
One can certainly raise legitimate questions about
how far to take Justice Scalia’s approach. Elsewhere,
I have given him two cheers, not three, criticizing his
formalism as sometimes too rigid and impractical
and his originalism as stretching beyond its textual
and historical foundations.60 Many of the Framers’
18th century criminal procedural rules have no clear
answers for 21st century problems: Think of scientific and forensic experts, high-tech searches, electronic privacy, or a plea-bargaining assembly line
that the Court is unwilling to dynamite.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia’s animating concerns will remain enduring touchstones of our law:
the importance of protecting the roles of legislatures,
juries, and the people; ensuring fair notice; and preserving liberty by limiting judicial discretion and
prosecutorial power. His criminal jurisprudence is
thus a microcosm of a principled judicial approach
to law more generally, and he will be greatly missed.
11
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